Term used for the theory, going back to Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716), of ‘possible worlds’; used to analyze necessity and possibility and similar notions, which are known as modal notions.
The actual world is regarded as merely one among an infinite set of logically possible worlds, some nearer to the actual world and some more remote. A statement is called necessary if it is true in all possible worlds, and possible if it is true in at least one. Possible worlds are usually regarded as real but abstract possibilities.
However, for David Kellogg Lewis they are concrete worlds, like this one only without any spatial or temporal connections with it.
Also see: counterpart theory
Source:
D K Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (1986)
Table of Contents
- 1 Videos
- 2 Related Products
- 2.1 The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism
- 2.2 The Worlds of Possibility: Modal Realism and the Semantics of Modal Logic
- 2.3 A Companion to David Lewis (Blackwell Companions to Philosophy)
- 2.4 Mere Possibilities: Metaphysical Foundations of Modal Semantics (Carl G. Hempel Lecture Series (2))
- 2.5 On the Plurality of Worlds
- 2.6 Cosmological Fine-Tuning Arguments: What (if Anything) Should We Infer from the Fine-Tuning of Our Universe for Life? (Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Religion)
- 2.7 A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, 2 Volume Set (Blackwell Companions to Philosophy)
- 2.8 The Quantum Labyrinth (Fundamental Theories of Physics)
- 2.9 Modal Epistemology (New Problems of Philosophy)
- 2.10 Nuel Belnap on Indeterminism and Free Action (Outstanding Contributions to Logic (2))
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