Any view which analyzes a given subject-matter in terms of words or language, derived from the Latin ‘nomen’ meaning ‘name’, ‘term’ or ‘word’.
A nominalist view of universals (see Platonism) says they are neither substantive realities (realism) nor mental concepts (conceptualism). Rather, they are simply words which we apply to a group of objects; the members of the group owing their membership to resembling each other in some relevant respect. (But this leads to difficulties: is not resemblance itself a universal? And what about the respect in which the resemblance holds?)
A nominalist about definitions says there can only be nominal definitions (accounts of how a word is or should be used), not real definitions (analyses of a concept or thing which the word is supposed to stand for: ‘res’ is Latin for ‘thing’).
A nominalist about modalities says there are only de dicto, not de re, modalities; that is, roughly, statements may be necessarily true, but things do not have necessary properties. (Necessarily, a husband has a wife; but no man has the property of necessarily having a wife.)
Also see: conceptualism, particularism, realism
Source:
M J Loux, ed., Universals and Particulars (1970)
Table of Contents
- 1 Videos
- 2 Related Products
- 2.1 Realism and Nominalism Revisited (Aquinas Lectures 19)
- 2.2 Nominalism about Properties: New Essays (Routledge Studies in Metaphysics)
- 2.3 Nominalism and Realism: Universals and Scientific Realism (Universals & Scientific Realism)
- 2.4 The Demonic Temptations of Medieval Nominalism
- 2.5 The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism
- 2.6 Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism
- 2.7 Nominalism
- 2.8 Priority Nominalism: Grounding Ostrich Nominalism as a Solution to the Problem of Universals (Synthese Library)
- 2.9 Apoha: Buddhist Nominalism and Human Cognition
- 2.10 Ostrich Nominalism
Last update 2020-06-17. Price and product availability may change.