Doctrine that nothing can be known for certain; that is, there is no infallible knowledge, but there can still be knowledge. We need not have logically conclusive justifications for what we know.
This was particularly insisted on by the American pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) in his opposition to foundationalism.
Also see: relevant alternatives theory, epistemic closure
Table of Contents
- 1 Videos
- 2 Related Products
- 2.1 Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge
- 2.2 Peirce's Pragmatic Theory of Inquiry: Fallibilism and Indeterminacy (Continuum Studies in American Philosophy)
- 2.3 Freedom, Indeterminism, and Fallibilism (Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism)
- 2.4 DESCARTES' FOUNDATIONALISM AND POPPER'S FALLIBILISM: A RECONCILIATION: SCEPTICISM AND EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION
- 2.5 Pragmatism: An Introduction
- 2.6 Fallibilism Democracy and the Market: The Meta-Theoretical Foundations of Popper's Political Philosophy
- 2.7 Christian Higher Education and Postmodernity: Institutional Fallibilism (Routledge Research in Religion and Education)
- 2.8 Knowledge and Fallibilism: Essays on Improving Education
- 2.9 The Suffering Stranger: Hermeneutics for Everyday Clinical Practice
- 2.10 The Methods of Science and Religion: Epistemologies in Conflict
- pragmatism
- epistemic closure principle
- pragmatic (or pragmatist) theory of truth
- propensity theory of probability
- Charles Sanders Peirce
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